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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 900307-CA 
v. : 
DONALD KITCHEN, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of possession of a 
controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to distribute, a 
second degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) 
(1990) . 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2 ) (f ) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Did defendant preserve his state constitutional 
challenges to the roadblock for appellate review? 
2. Did defendant preserve for appellate review the 
issue of whether the roadblock violated the state and federal 
constitutions "because it was not justified by demonstrated need 
nor properly regulated?" 
3. Was the roadblock challenged by defendant 
unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful because there is no 
express statutory authorization for roadblocks? 
4. Did the warrantless search of defendant's luggage 
incident to the roadblock stop violate the fourth amendment? 
The factual findings underlying the trial court's 
ruling on a motion to suppress will not be disturbed on appeal 
unless they are clearly erroneous; however, in assessing the 
trial court's legal conclusions based on its factual findings, 
the appellate court applies a "correction of error" standard of 
review. State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App.), 
cert, granted, P.2d (Utah 1989). Accord United States 
v. Butler, 904 F.2d 1482, 1484 (10th Cir. 1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule 
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on 
appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Donald Kitchen, was charged with possession 
of a controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to disribute, a 
second degree felony, under Utah Code Ann* § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) 
(1990) (R. 4). 
After the trial court denied defendant's motion to 
suppress evidence seized incident to the stop of defendant at a 
roadblock, the case was submitted to the court for a 
determination of guilt on the evidence developed at the 
suppression hearing. Based on that evidence, the court found 
defendant guilty as charged (R. 54). 
The court sentenced defendant to a term of one to 
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison, fined him $1,250, and 
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ordered him to pay certain sums to the Victim's Reparation Fund 
and the Substance Abuse Prevention Account (R. 55). Execution of 
the prison term was suspended and defendant was placed on 
probation (R. 55-56). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of the issues raised on appeal, the 
pertinent facts are those set out in the trial court's ruling, 
which defendant does not challenge (see Ruling at R. 26-29) (a 
copy of which is contained in the Addendum). Those findings of 
fact are as follows: 
1. On Wednesday, May 17, 1989, defendants 
were in a vehicle at a roadblock on 
Interstate 15 at milepost 220, south of Nephi 
in Juab County. 
2. Notice of the roadblock had been 
published approximately two weeks earlier in 
the Provo Daily Herald and the Nephi Times 
News. The said roadblock was conducted after 
classroom training sessions with officers 
from Pleasant Grove, American Fork, Alpine, 
Orem, and Utah County and Juab County 
Sheriff's Department. Sergeant Mangelson was 
the supervising officer on the roadblock. 
The roadblock was approved by Jim Utley, 
supervisor of Sergeant Mangelson. 
3. Approximately thirty-five officers 
participated in the roadblock as part of the 
training session. There were officers on 
each side of the freeway, stopping traffic in 
both directions. The said roadblock was a 
continuation of the training session and was 
conducted for the purpose of checking for 
drivers licenses, registration, liability 
insurance, auto safety and observations for 
any violations of the criminal law including 
alcohol and controlled substance abuse. 
4. All of the traffic was stopped in both 
the north and southbound lanes except for 
busses [sic] and tractor trailers. Defendant 
Burke believed that some automobiles occupied 
by older folks were not stopped but were 
-3-
waived through. The other witnesses either 
denied this or did not observe any 
automobiles that were waived through. The 
Court finds that all automobiles and light 
trucks were stopped. 
5. Three to four signs were set up in each 
direction giving notice of the roadblock. 
The signs were spaced out over a distance of 
approximately one quarter mile from the point 
of stopping. 
6. Defendant Kitchen was driving his vehicle 
(Blazer) south with one passenger, defendant 
Burke, when he was stopped at the roadblock. 
7. Officer John Lloyd approached defendant's 
[sic] vehicle, on the driver's side. 
Sergeant Mangelson testified he was directly 
behind officer Lloyd observing Lloyd's 
conduct, and that he could smell a strong 
odor of burnt marijuana coming from the 
vehicle. Sergeant Mangelson then moved 
closer to the vehicle to make sure of the 
odor. He then moved over to the passenger 
side of the vehicle and directed a question 
to both defendants, "was marijuana in the 
vehicle?" Both defendants replied no, there 
was not. Sergeant Mangelson asked if he 
could look in the vehicle and was told the 
defendants were in a hurry to get to Las 
Vegas and he could not search the vehicle. 
Officer Mangelson told defendant Kitchen to 
pull the vehicle over to the side of the 
road. Sergeant Mangelson then,-*still being 
on the passenger side of the vehicle, asked 
the passenger (defendant Burke) to step out. 
Sergeant Mangelson then told defendants he 
"could smell marijuana, the odor was very 
strong. They might just as well give me the 
marijuana because I could smell it and I know 
it was there." Defendant Kitchen responded 
by opening the console and giving Mangelson 
two baggies of green material which were 
later confirmed to be marijuana. Sergeant 
Mangelson further testified that the 
passenger (Burke) did not get out of the 
vehicle until the vehicle had been driven out 
of the coned area. That when the vehicle was 
driven out of the coned area and came to a 
stop that Burke was asked to get out of the 
vehicle and the door opened and he got out. 
That Sergeant Mangelson did not look through 
the vehicle nor "crawled in the vehicle" 
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until Kitchen had actually given him the "two 
baggies." 
8. Defendant's testimony conflicted with 
that of Sergeant Mangelson's as follows: 
At a time when the vehicle was first 
stopped and before the vehicle was driven out 
of the coned area, Kitchen testified: "I 
guess Danny's door flew open and I seen him 
lunge over like that and because he was 
leaning over on it and didn't expect the door 
to open and the door opened and Danny just 
kind of moved to the side." 
Burke testified: "I remember Officer 
Mangelson walked around to my side of the 
vehicle. He came around the front way and I 
was sitting in the vehicle, he opened the 
door and asked me for identification." After 
the vehicle had been pulled over to the 
shoulder of the road, Burke testified: "I 
got out and he still had my driver's license 
and I don't believe he said anything else to 
me at that time. He looked in the car and I 
believe Don was still sitting in the vehicle 
in the driver's side." 
9. Sergeant Mangelson placed the defendants 
under arrest and read them their Miranda 
rights immediately following Kitchen's giving 
the baggies of marijuana to Sergeant 
Mangelson. 
10. Subsequent to defendant Kitchen giving 
the marijuana to Sergeant Mangelson, Sergeant 
Mangelson looked through the interior of the 
vehicle and found in the console a small vile 
[sic] which contained a white powder which 
appeared to be cocaine and later tested out 
to be cocaine. Officer Mangelson asked 
defendant Kitchen what the white powder was 
and Kitchen did not respond. Officer 
Mangelson observed a bulge in Kitchen's 
pocket and inquired what it was. Kitchen 
said it was $2,000.00 and was asked to 
deliver it to Officer Mangelson. The sum of 
money delivered exceeded $2,000.00. 
Officer Mangelson continued his search 
of the vehicle and found a container with 
marijuana roaches. Behind the back seat of 
the Blazer vehicle there were three suitcases 
which the officers searched, and in one 
suitcase there was a J.C. Penney bag which 
contained twenty-seven ounces of cocaine. 
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(R. 26-29). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not err in denying defendant's 
motion to suppress. Under Utah statutory law, the police have 
implicit authority to set up the roadblock at issue in this case. 
Defendant's state constitutional challenges to the 
roadblock should not be considered by this Court on appeal 
because they were not adequately developed b€>low. 
Nor did defendant preserve for appellate review the 
issue of whether the roadblock violated the state and federal 
constitutions "because it was not justified by demonstrated need 
nor properly regulated." 
The warrantless search of defendant's suitcase was 
lawful under the automobile exception to the fourth amendment's 
warrant requirement. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S 
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE 
ROADBLOCK BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT ADEQUATELY 
DEVELOPED BELOW. 
In his memorandum filed in support of his motion to 
suppress in the trial court, defendant made only passing 
references to article I# section 14 of the Utah Constitution (R. 
14-22). He did not set forth any analysis independent of fourth 
amendment analysis to support his claim that the roadblock in 
this case violated the state constitution. Because defendant's 
state constitutional arguments were not adequately developed in 
the trial court, this Court should not consider them for the 
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first time on appeal. See State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327-28 
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, granted, P.2d (Utah 1989). See 
also State v. Julian, 771 P.2d 1061, 1062 n.l (Utah 1989); State 
v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 883 n.4 (Utah Ct. App.), petition for 
cert, filed, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 78 (Utah 1990); State v. Arroyo, 
770 P.2d 153, 154 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1989), reversed on other 
grounds, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESERVE FOR APPELLATE 
REVIEW THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE ROADBLOCK 
VIOLATED THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS 
"BECAUSE IT WAS NOT JUSTIFIED BY DEMONSTRATED 
NEED NOR PROPERLY REGULATED." 
Defendant argues that, even if it were assumed that 
roadblocks in the abstract are constitutional, the roadblock in 
the instant case violated the state and federal constitutions 
"because it was not justified by demonstrated need nor properly 
regulated." However, because defendant did not present this 
argument to the trial court as a ground for suppressing the 
evidence, he is precluded from raising it-for the first time on 
appeal. State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985).1 
Defendant does not make a general challenge to the type of 
roadblock set up in this case (i.e., a roadblock whose primary 
purpose was for checking driver's license, vehicle registration, 
and proof of insurance). However, it is noteworthy that the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently reaffirmed its position 
that this type of roadblock does not violate the fourth 
amendment. United States v. Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d 200, 202 
(10th Cir. 1990) (decided after the United States Supreme Court 
had issued its opinion in Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 
110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990), which upheld Michigan's sobriety 
checkpoint program against a fourth amendment challenge). Cf. 
Simmons v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 200, 380 S.E.2d 656 (1989) 
(holding that the manner in which a driver's license/equipment 
roadblock was conducted violated the fourth amendment). 
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POINT III 
THE ABSENCE OF EXPRESS STATUTORY 
AUTHORIZATION FOR THE ROADBLOCK AT WHICH 
DEFENDANT WAS STOPPED DOES NOT RENDER THE 
ROADBLOCK UNCONSTITUTIONAL OR OTHERWISE 
UNLAWFUL; NOR DO UTAH CODE ANN. §S 41-1-17 
(1988) AND 77-7-15 (1990) LIMIT THE AUTHORITY 
OF OFFICERS TO STOP VEHICLES TO SITUATIONS 
WHERE THEY HAVE A REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT 
EITHER THE VEHICLE OR ONE OF ITS OCCUPANTS 
HAS VIOLATED OR IS VIOLATING THE LAW. 
Defendant argues that the roadblock at which he was 
stopped was unconstitutional because (1) the legislature has not 
expressly or impliedly authorized such roadblocks, and (2) the 
legislature has specifically limited a police officer's authority 
to stop a vehicle for administrative or investigatory purposes to 
those situations where the officer has at least a reasonable 
suspicion that either the vehicle or one of its occupants has 
violated or is violating the law. Each of these contentions will 
be addressed separately. 
Defendant argues that the roadblock in this case could 
not be constitutional unless there is either express or implied 
statutory authority to set up such roadblocks. Although it is 
not clear that the absence of express or implied statutory 
authority would render the roadblock unconstitutional, as opposed 
to simply unlawful, see, e.g., Nelson v. Lane County, 304 Or. 97, 
102 n.2, 743 P.2d 692, 695 n.2 (1987) ("We have often stressed 
the need to examine statutory authority and the limitations 
imposed by that authority before reaching any constitutional 
question."), there is implied authority in Utah's statutes for 
roadblocks set up for law enforcement purposes. The State agrees 
with defendant's conclusion that there is no express statutory 
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authority for the type of roadblock at issue here. £f. Utah Code 
Ann. S 23-20-19 (1984) (referring to roadblocks and checking 
stations set up by Division of Wildlife Resources). 
The legislature has granted peace officers broad 
authority to enforce the laws of this state. For example, the 
Utah Highway Patrol is statutorily authorized to "enforce the 
state laws and rules governing use of the highways" and to 
"regulate traffic on all highways and roads of the state." Utah 
Code Ann. S 27-10-4(a) & (b) (1989). The authority of municipal 
police officers is set forth in Utah Code Ann. S 10-3-914(1) 
(Supp. 1990): 
Within the boundaries of the municipality, 
police officers have the same authority as 
deputy sheriffs, including at all times the 
authority to preserve the public peace, 
prevent crime, detect and arrest offenders, 
suppress riots, protect persons and property, 
remove nuisances existing in the public 
streets, roads, and highways, enforce every 
law relating to the suppression of offenses, 
and perform all duties required of them by 
ordinance or resolution. 
Similar statutes relate to the duties of the sheriff and the 
sheriff's deputies, Utah Code Ann. S 17-22-2 (Supp. 1990), and 
the duties of peace officers generally to enforce the provisions 
of the Motor Vehicle Act, Utah Code Ann. S 41-1-17 (1988). These 
statutes are most reasonably read as giving peace officers broad 
authority to engage in any law enforcement practice that is 
constitutional, unless some specific statutory restriction 
exists. As the Appellate Court of Illinois correctly concluded 
in rejecting an argument similar to that advanced by defendant 
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here: 
Criminal statutes do contain an implied 
right of police to enforce them. While there 
are state and federal constitutional 
limitations on the means of enforcement, 
these limits are constitutional and not 
inherent in every criminal statute. The 
State has passed laws requiring safety 
equipment. Absent evidence of some contrary 
intent, the police should be able to enforce 
those laws in a constitutional manner. 
We are loath to say that the State has 
anything but a strong interest in seeing that 
all motor vehicles are safe, and given the 
absence of any intent to provide otherwise, 
the safety equipment statutes carry with them 
an implied right of the officers to inspect 
autos in any constitutional manner. 
People v. Estrada, 68 Ill.App.3d 272, 24 111.Dec. 924, 386 N.E.2d 
128, 133-34 (1979) (upholding vehicle safety equipment 
checkpoint), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 968 (1979). Although 
defendant cites contrary authority, Nelson v. Lane County, 304 
Or. 97, 743 P.2d 692 (1987); State v. Boyanovsky, 304 Or. 131, 
743 P.2d 711 (1987); State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okl. Cr. 
2 
1984) , the better view is that expressed in Estrada and the 
dissenting opinion in Nelson, 304 Or. at 128, 743 P.2d at 710 
(Peterson, C.J., dissenting). There are numerous law enforcement 
practices involving searches or seizures which have been 
Defendant also cites State v. Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 756 
P.2d 1057 (1988), in support of his position; however, that case 
is distinguishable from the other cases he cites, in that the 
Idaho Legislature explicitly limited the use of roadblocks to 
situations where officers desired to Mapprehend[] persons 
reasonably believed by such officers to be wanted for violation 
of the laws of this state, of any other state, or of the United 
States[.]M Idk at 1061 (quoting Idaho Code S 19-621) (emphasis 
in original). 
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recognized by this Court and the Utah Supreme Court as 
constitutionally permissible and otherwise proper even though 
there is no explicit statutory authority for the particular 
practice. See, e.g.# State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 993 (Utah 
1989) (recognizing plain view doctrine which allows an officer to 
seize evidence without a warrant if the officer is lawfully 
present and has probable cause to believe the item is evidence of 
a crime); State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1986) 
(recognizing search incident to arrest exception to the fourth 
amendment's warrant and probable cause requirements); State v. ,. 
Hyqh, 711 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1985) (holding that inventory 
searches are permitted under the fourth amendment and article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution); State v. Droneburg, 781 
P.2d 1303, 1305 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (recognizing the automobile 
exception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement). In 
short, the most appropriate initial inquiry with respect to any 
law enforcement practice is to ask whether it is constitutional, 
not whether it is explicitly authorized by statute. While the 
particular practice must impliedly be within the statutory 
authority of a peace officer, explicit authority should not be 
required. Of course, if a statute expressly prohibits a 
particular practice or limits its use to certain circumstances, a 
constitutional practice would be unlawful if it were not within 
the statutory restrictions. 
Defendant attacks the notion that peace officers in 
Utah have implied statutory authority to use roadblocks on the 
ground that police authority to stop vehicles and their occupants 
has been expressly limited by the legislature in Utah Code Ann. 
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S 41-1-17 (1988) and Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990). Section 
41-1-17 provides in pertinent part: 
[P]eace officers [and] state patrolmen . . 
. shall have power and it shall be their 
duty: 
(c) When on duty, upon reasonable belief 
that any vehicle is being operated in 
violation of any provision of this act or of 
any law regulating the operation of vehicles 
to require the driver thereof to stop, 
exhibit his driver's license and the 
registration card issued for the vehicles 
[sic] and submit to an inspection of such 
vehicle, the registration plates and 
registration card thereon. 
Section 77-7-15 states: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed or is 
in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his 
name, address and an explanation of his 
actions. 
Defendant reads these provisions as limitations on an officer's 
authority to make a stop of a vehicle or its occupants. However, 
this Court has consistently viewed section 77-7-15 as merely a 
codification of the constitutional standard for an investigatory 
stop enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See, e.g. , 
State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. 
Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 507 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Although neither 
this Court nor the Utah Supreme Court has had occasion to 
construe section 41-1-17, that provision appears to be nothing 
more than a codification of the constitutional standard for an 
investigatory stop of a vehicle set forth in Delaware v. Prouse, 
440 U.S. 648 (1979) (under the fourth amendment, to lawfully stop 
a vehicle for investigatory purposes, an officer must have at 
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least a reasonable suspicion that either the vehicle or an 
occupant has violated or is about to violate the law--i.e., a 
traffic or equipment regulation, or any applicable criminal law). 
Thus# it is no surprise that Utah's appellate courts have 
consistently applied the Prouse standard in evaluating the 
validity of a particular vehicle stop, without any reference to 
section 41-1-17. See, e.g., State v. Gibson, 665 P.2d 1302, 1304 
(Utah), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 894 (1983); State v. Baird, 763 
P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
In sum, sections 77-7-15 and 41-1-17 are not reasonably 
read as defining the only circumstances in which an officer may 
stop a vehicle or its occupants; they merely codify established 
constitutional standards without prohibiting other police conduct 
that, although outside the scope of these statutory provisions, 
is nevertheless constitutional. 
POINT IV 
THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S 
SUITCASE WAS JUSTIFIED UNDER THE AUTOMOBILE 
EXCEPTION TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S WARRANT 
REQUIREMENT. 
Defendant argues that the warrantless search of his 
suitcase inside his vehicle violated the fourth amendment. His 
claim can be disposed of summarily. 
Defendant does not challenge the trial court's 
conclusion that there was probable cause to believe that there 
was contraband in his vehicle. Br. of Appellant at 39. Rather, 
he focuses on the question of whether there were exigent 
circumstances to justify the warrantless search of his vehicle 
and suitcase. He relies solely on the state constitutional 
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analysis engaged in by two justices in State v. Larocco/ 794 P.2d 
460, 467-71 (Utah 1990) (Durham, J., joined by Zimmerman, J.; 
Stewart, J., concurring in the result), where the lead opinion 
essentially rejects the automobile exception to the fourth 
amendment's warrant requirement developed by the United States 
Supreme Court, see Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); 
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); California v. Carney, 
471 U.S. 386 (1985). Because defendant did not make this state 
constitutional argument below, it should not be considered by 
this Court. State v. Carter, 707 P.2d at 660; State v. Johnson, 
771 P.2d at 327. 
Defendant does not claim the search of his suitcase 
violated the fourth amendment. Indeed, that search was justified 
under the automobile exception recognized in Carroll and 
Chambers. See also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) 
(where police officers have probable cause to search an entire 
vehicle, they may conduct a warrantless search of every part of 
the vehicle and its contents, including all containers and 
packages, that may conceal the object of the search). 
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CONCLUSION 
BaBed on the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
affirm both the denial of defendant's motion to suppress and his 
conviction. •/_— 
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